Streptococcus pneumoniae is increasingly recognised as an important cause of bacterial meningitis in the African meningitis belt. The World Health Organization sets guidelines for response to outbreaks of meningococcal meningitis, but there are no current guidelines for outbreaks where S. pneumoniae is implicated. We aimed to evaluate the impact of using a similar response to target outbreaks of vaccinepreventable pneumococcal meningitis in the meningitis belt. Here, we adapt a previous model of reactive vaccination for meningococcal outbreaks to estimate the potential impact of reactive vaccination in a recent pneumococcal meningitis outbreak in the Brong-Ahafo region of central Ghana using weekly line list data on all suspected cases over a period of five months. We determine the sensitivity and specificity of various epidemic thresholds and model the cases and deaths averted by reactive vaccination. An epidemic threshold of 10 suspected cases per 100,000 population per week performed the best, predicting large outbreaks with 100% sensitivity and more than 85% specificity. In this outbreak, reactive vaccination would have prevented a lower number of cases per individual vaccinated (approximately 15,300 doses per case averted) than previously estimated for meningococcal outbreaks.
Introduction 47
Following the rollout of the serogroup A conjugate vaccine, MenAfriVac, across the 48 African meningitis belt since 2010, the incidence of meningococcal meningitis due to 49 serogroup A has sharply declined.(1) With an accompanying increase in surveillance quality, 50 it has become increasingly clear that meningitis due to Streptococcus pneumoniae (Spn) 51 represents a substantial proportion of the burden of endemic meningitis in this region. In 52 addition to this, localized outbreaks of pneumococcal disease, in excess of normal seasonal 53 activity, have been reported.(2-7) 54
The introduction of a 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV13) into 55 Outbreaks of meningococcal meningitis in the African meningitis belt trigger a 68 reactive vaccination response, with the public health goal of curtailing the outbreak and 69 thus preventing cases and deaths. It has been suggested that outbreaks of pneumococcal 70 However, this process takes some time as a request must be completed and reviewed and 79 vaccine stocks must be delivered, often to inaccessible areas. For this model, we considered 80 the potential impact of mass vaccination response in affected districts with PCV13, to see 81 whether similar guidelines may be appropriate for outbreaks of pneumococcal meningitis. 82
When discussing disease in the African meningitis belt, it is important to distinguish 83 between seasonal fluctuations in endemic disease, outbreaks -which may be defined as an 84 isolated district surpassing the epidemic weekly incidence threshold, and widespread 85 epidemics, which affect whole regions or countries in a season. For the purposes of this 86 study, we define an outbreak of pneumococcal meningitis using two criteria: i) weekly 87 incidence on the regional or district level of suspected meningitis over a single dry season 88 exceeding some epidemic threshold that reflects the upper bound of dry season endemic 89 incidence, ii) where pneumococcus is the predominant cause. We retain the term "epidemic 90 threshold" for consistency with meningococcal vaccination policy, but do not mean to imply 91 that these events constitute widespread epidemics. and specificity of a variety of incidence thresholds (10, 7, 5, and 3 suspected cases per 102 100,000 per week) for predicting a range of sizes of outbreaks (20, 40, 60, 80, and 100 103 cumulative cases per 100,000). We then modelled reactive vaccination of 5-to 29-year-olds 104 building on methods developed in an earlier paper, using an epidemic threshold of 10 105 suspected cases per 100,000 per week to define the beginning of the outbreak and an 106 endemic threshold of 2 suspected cases per 100,000 per week to define the end of the 107 outbreak. (15) We also performed a sensitivity analysis using a lower epidemic threshold of 3 108 suspected cases per 100,000 per week, which corresponds to the alert threshold for 109 meningococcal meningitis. We chose to target 5-to 29-year-olds because this would 110 effectively extend coverage to all individuals under 30 years of age (we assumed children 111 under the age of 5 years were protected by the routine infant PCV13 vaccine schedule) and 112 because the highest incidence of confirmed pneumococcal meningitis was observed in the 113 10 to 14-and 15to 29-year age groups. 114
As a variety of laboratory tests were used for case confirmation, aetiology was 115 classified according to Table 1 . In a large proportion of cases (60%), aetiology could not be 116 definitively determined. For this reason, we modelled true cases of Spn meningitis weekly 117 for each district as 118
where C s,i is the number of suspected cases reported in week i, p n is the proportion of CSF 120 samples in the district testing negative (in Table 1 , both probable and confirmed negative 121 cases), and p Spn is the proportion of all confirmed cases in the district due to Spn. This 122 modelled case count is hereafter referred to as likely Spn cases. Because there was some 123 uncertainty regarding false negative tests, we performed a sensitivity analysis where p n is 124 only the proportion of CSF samples in the district testing negative by two or more tests (in 125   Table 1 , confirmed negative cases). 126
We then simulated vaccination with PCV13 using the same methods described in 127 One district, Sene West, was excluded from the analysis despite having crossed the 138 epidemic threshold because the majority of confirmed cases were due to Nm. 139
We determined the cases prevented, deaths prevented, number needed to 140 vaccinate to prevent a case (NNV) and number needed to vaccinate to prevent a death 141 after crossing the epidemic threshold (lag of zero, two or four weeks, respectively). 143
144
Results
145
Twenty of the 27 districts of the Brong-Ahafo Region were represented in the line 146 list. The districts had a mean population size of 105,000. Over the 19-week study period, 147 nine of these had cumulative suspected meningitis incidence greater than 20 suspected 148 cases per 100,000; five had cumulative incidence greater than 40 per 100,000; four had 149 cumulative incidence greater than 80 per 100,000, and three had cumulative incidence 150 greater than 100 per 100,000. For predicting larger outbreaks of 60 suspected cases per 151 100,000 and greater, all thresholds had a sensitivity and negative predictive value of 100%, 152 but a threshold of 10 per 100,000 per week had the best positive predictive values and 153
specificity (Figure 1). 154
Five districts (Jaman North, Nkoranza South, Tain, Techiman North, and Wenchi) 155 crossed the epidemic threshold of 10 cases per 100,000 per week, three of which exceeded 156 a cumulative incidence of 100 cases per 100,000 (Figure 2) . 157
Sixty six percent of suspected bacterial meningitis cases in the five outbreak districts 158 and 73% of confirmed pneumococcal meningitis cases occurred in 5-to 29-year-olds. Figure  159 3 shows the age distribution of suspected and confirmed incidence of meningitis in the five 160 districts triggering the epidemic threshold. 161
Vaccinating individuals between 5 and 29 years of age in the five eligible districts 162 would have required approximately 284,000 doses of vaccine (Table 3 Excluding the sensitivity analysis, the number needed to vaccinate to prevent a case 188 (NNV) is higher than the range of previous estimates for reactive meningococcal campaigns 189 (3,700 to 11,600 for 2 to 4 week lag), (15) occur in the targeted age group. The meningococcal model also assumed that 79% of 214 suspected cases were due to NmW. In addition, the surveillance system relies on a case 215 definition of meningitis; immunisation against Spn may prevent additional cases of 216 pneumonia and septicaemia making these estimates conservative. 217
However, the predictions of this model are highly dependent on the age distribution 218 of cases, the proportion of cases due to Spn, and the overall shape of the incidence curve 219 over time. The data from the Brong-Ahafo outbreak show a particularly strong peak in the 220 15-to 29-year age group, similar to distributions reported from endemic situations. (18) By 221 contrast, the distribution of incidence of Spn meningitis from Traore 2009 peaks sharply in 222 infants but is otherwise fairly even across age groups despite a description in the discussion 223
of "epidemic" patterns.(3) 224
Because many cases had no associated laboratory data, we have chosen to model 225 suspected Spn meningitis cases. As our sensitivity analysis has shown (Table S1 ), reactive 226 vaccination may be more or less effective depending on underlying assumptions about the 227 true proportion of suspected meningitis cases caused by S. pneumoniae. The case-fatality 228 rates in each category support our classification system, with low rates in bacteria-negative 229 cases, intermediate rates in untested cases, and high rates in Spn-and Nm-confirmed cases 230 (Table 1) . 231
These predictions are also dependent on how quickly the outbreak progresses. In 232 this outbreak, 14% of suspected cases occurred within four weeks of triggering the epidemic 233 threshold -in other words, 14% of suspected cases would be missed by a reactive response 234 It is clear that any reactive response must be timely in order for it to be effective. A 245 particular challenge is ensuring rapid microbiological confirmation of the organism 246 responsible for the outbreak and serotyping of pneumococcal isolates to determine if the 247 outbreak is due to a vaccine-type strain. In Brong-Ahafo, serotyping facilities were initially 248 not available locally and samples were sent to the MRC laboratory in The Gambia, leading to 249 an interval of several weeks before results were available. A technical mission from MRC the 250 Gambia provided support to establish serotyping capacity in Sunyani hospital in Brong-251
Ahafo during the course of the outbreak. In addition, CDC established PCR capability at 252
Tamali Zonal Public Health Laboratory during the outbreak, which serves Brong-Ahafo. If 253 reactive vaccination for pneumococcal meningitis outbreaks were to be recommended by 254 WHO, it will be important to ensure that other meningitis belt regions also establish and 255 maintain serotyping capacity. Even if reactive vaccination for pneumococcal meningitis 256 outbreaks is not recommended, building laboratory capacity in these regions will benefit 257 health systems more broadly. Graphical Abstract Click here to download Supplemental Files: graphical.pdf
